Afghanistan Policy Page

A one-page brief on a major issue concerning U.S. policy and engagement in Afghanistan.

Counternarcotics in Afghanistan

11 February 2010

Take Aways

• The growing of poppies is a symptom of the lack of effective State governance in Afghanistan.

• The growing of poppies, production and trafficking of narcotics, and stockpiling of opium corrupts the whole of Afghan society and State.

• The illegal narcotics industry in Afghanistan is an important source of funding for insurgents.

• Famers will not starve if they cease growing poppies. Many analysts believe farmers will be better off without poppies.

Key Issues

Illicit Opium Production – Afghanistan currently supplies over 90% of the global supply of illicit opiates, including heroin.

Opium Funds the Insurgents – Currently insurgents accrue over $125 million annually (10-15% of their total funding) through levies on poppy farmers, protection fees on processing labs, transit fees on drug convoys, and taxation on imports of opium chemical precursors.

Revenue and Trafficking – The equivalent of 3,500 tons of opium is trafficked through Afghanistan’s porous borders each year: 40% through Iran, 30% through Pakistan, and the rest via Central Asia. Between 2002 and 2008 Afghan farmers earned a total of about $6.4 billion, and Afghan traffickers earned around $18 billion from opiate processing and trade.

Production and Stockpiling – Due to the dramatic production increases after 2005, around 12,000 tons of opium are stockpiled in Afghanistan. 13,000 tons of heroin precursor chemicals (controlled and non-controlled) are imported annually into Afghanistan; very little is intercepted.

In Quotes

“We take 3% of the revenue and 100% of the blame.” President Hamid Karzai discussing opium.

Key Facts

123,000 hectares of poppies (the size of Los Angeles) were cultivated in 2009, and each year Afghanistan exports approximately 3,500 tons of opium.

The UK is the lead nation coordinating Afghanistan Counternarcotics issues.

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency has been assisting with counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan since 2005 with Foreign-deployed Advisory and Support Teams.

• Nearly 100 DEA agents are currently in Afghanistan.

• Three DEA officers were killed in October 2009.

Afghanistan’s Counternarcotics Strategy involves the efforts of several Afghan ministries:

• The Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, headed by Minister Zarar.

• The Ministry of the Interior’s Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan enforce Afghanistan’s drug laws.

• Several Ministries, including Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Agriculture, Water and Energy, share the mission of providing alternative livelihoods for poppy farmers.

Counternarcotics under the Taliban: The Taliban regime only had one year (2000) during which they declared that opium cultivation was illegal. However, the export of opium was not forbidden, and the Taliban regime profitably cornered the market with their stockpiles during the following harvest season.

Major Challenges

Large Criminal Networks – Groups with vertical integration in the illicit narcotics industry with links to corrupt government officials or Taliban militants violently resist interdictions.

Banking – 5-10% of the $65 billion annual opium revenue is laundered by informal banking systems; the rest is laundered through complex, though legal, international trade activities.

Security Environment – 98% of Afghan opium production is concentrated in the unstable south and west, making enforcement and rural development for alternative livelihoods difficult.

Unemployment – Poppy cultivation and harvesting is very labor intensive. Wheat cultivation, a proposed alternative, would employ 88% less labor; unemployment is already around 40%.

Government Credibility – Analysts have commented that the lack of a credible counternarcotics communications campaign has slowed progress towards convincing Afghans to stop growing poppy.

Possible Questions

• What is being done to persuade farmers to stop growing poppies?

• How is the effectiveness of alternative livelihood programs being measured and evaluated?

• What is being done to encourage regional cooperation for drug interdictions and precursor chemical interception?

• How are international development assistance and counternarcotics programs being coordinated in Afghanistan?

In the News

In a report issued on 10 February 2010, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime projected a stable opium crop in Afghanistan in 2010. Opium cultivation in Afghanistan has decreased by one third (36%) over the past two years, from a record high of 193,000 hectares in 2007 to 123,000 hectares in 2009. UNODC

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